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How does immigration affect natives local wages? A vast literature considers this, much of it
focused on Mexican immigration to the United States. Prior work emphasizes the importance
of instrumenting for immigrant destinations, the key role of experience-skill cells, and the
potential for spillovers to national markets. I build on these, using the Mexican ’Tequila Crisis’
of the mid-1990s as an exogenous shock to immigration. Instrumentation thus includes both a
time dimension for the shock period, plus a destination dimension as in prior work. The 1.5%
immigration shock of the Tequila Crisis lowered the wages of young low skilled US natives by 1
to 1.5 percent. It also prompted interstate labor reallocation. The share of low skilled workers
is estimated to decrease by 2 percentage points as a result of the shock. This explains why
within five years, national markets adjust, leaving no evidence of differential spatial impact.
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1 Introduction
Despite the large inflows of immigrants into many OECD countries since the late 1970s, there is
no consensus on the causal impact of immigration on labor market outcomes. The reason for the
lack of consensus is twofold. First, immigrants decide both where and when to migrate given the
economic conditions in the source and host countries. Second, natives decide to move to a different
location or change industries or occupations if immigrants compete with them in their jobs. The
combination of these two endogenous decisions makes it hard for the researcher to estimate the
causal effect of immigration on native labor market outcomes.
In this paper, I use the ’Mexican Tequila crisis’ as an exogenous push factor to address these
concerns. In December 1994, the government led by Ernesto Zedillo unexpectedly allowed greater
flexibility of the peso vis à vis the dollar. This resulted in an attack on the peso that caused Mexico
to abandon the peg that led to an economic crisis in Mexico. Figure 1 shows the US and Mexican
GDP growth rates between 1992-1998. Mexican GDP growth fell 11 percentage points, from a
positive 6% in 1994 to a negative 5% in 1995. This occurred while US GDP maintained a fairly
constant growth rate of around 5%:
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Figure 1: Mexican and US GDP growth rates 1991-1999
Notes: This figure shows Mexican and US total GDP growth rates by year. Vertical lines indicate the period
1994-1996.
This deep recession prompted many Mexicans to emigrate. Precise estimates on how many
Mexicans actually emigrated are hard to obtain (see (Passel, 2005), (Passel et al., 2012) or (Hanson,
2006)). Many Mexicans go to the US illegally, sometimes escaping the count of US statistical
agencies. However, most sources point to the fact that 1995 was a high immigration year1. As
a result of the Mexican crisis migration flows to the US were likely 50% higher in 1995 than in
a typical year of the 1990s2. A related piece of evidence is the marked increase in ’coyote’ prices
starting in 19953 -the price of the smuggler that facilitates migration across the Mexican-US border.
1Using data from the 2000 US Census, from the US Department of Homeland Security (documented immigrants)
or estimates of undocumented immigrants from the Immigration and Naturalization Service as reported in (Hanson,
2006) or estimates from (Passel et al., 2012) we see an unusual spike in the inflow of immigrants in 1995. I will
discuss the numbers on immigration arrivals later in this paper. Several things are worth taking into account at this
point. The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the number of immigrants allowed into the US, probably encouraging
more people to immigrate or ask for admission (despite being in the US for some time) in 1991. This is why I report
my numbers starting in 1992, centred in 1995 -the year of the shock-.
2This is around 160,000 more Mexicans than in a normal year. See the data description section for more details.
3See (Hanson, 2006). Unfortunately his data do not expand to the end of the 1990s.
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This may be in part due to increased border enforcement, but it also probably reflects the increased
willingness to emigrate from Mexico. Figure 2 shows the best existing estimates of Mexican yearly
inflows by (Passel et al., 2012)4. The lower panel of Figure 2 shows that real low skilled wages,
with a lag, appear to move inversely to the inflows of the corresponding workers from Mexico5. On
its face, Mexican inflows appear to depress US low skilled wages.
4In the empirical section I complement these with my own estimates on net flows based on US and Mexican
Censuses.
5CPI base year for real wages is 1999. The sensitivity of migration flows to home country economic conditions is
well known, see (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999) or (Hanson and Grogger, 2011). In the rest of the paper I use the
weekly wage in stead of the hourly wage. In this graph I use the hourly wage to show that we have a similar picture
to the one we obtain with the weekly wage. See more details below.
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Figure 2: Mexican emigration to the US by year of arrival and US low skilled wage
Note: The top panel shows estimates on population ((Passel et al., 2012)) and worker average net flows (computed
from from the US and Mexican Census known stocks of potential Mexican workers in the US in 1990, 1995 and
2000) from Mexico to the US by year of arrival. The bottom panel shows the average low skilled hourly wage by
year. See more details in Section 4.1.
The direct impact of the Mexican Tequila crisis on the aggregate US economy was probably
rather small. The Mexican crisis could have affected the US through trade in two different ways.
Demand in Mexico for US products could have dropped, worsening the economic conditions of US
states exporting to Mexico. In fact, we do observe that US exports to Mexico decreased in 1995 from
around .7% to .6% of US GDP. Nonetheless, to make sure that I am not confounding the effects of
Mexican immigration and of exports to Mexico I will consider it closely in the empirical exercises6.
6In fact, US states trading with Mexico and states receiving immigrants from Mexico are not the same.
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A second possibility is that Mexico increased its exports to the US increasing competition in US
states producing goods also produced in Mexico. Aggregate trade statistics show that this is not
the case in the period of interest.
The Mexican Crisis of 1995 offers an opportunity to estimate the effect of an unexpected im-
migration inflow on US labor market outcomes. In particular, I rely heavily on three aspects of
Mexican immigration in the 1990s:
1. Mexican immigrants tend to settle in particular enclaves (Card, 2001).
2. Mexican immigrants are predominantly low skilled (Borjas and Katz, 2007).
3. Mexican immigrants tend to be young upon arrival, see also (Smith, 2012).
Using this unexpected flow of young low skilled Mexican immigrants into particular US states
I study how the US labor market reacts. I first document how during the years after the shock,
1995-1997, the wages of young native low skilled workers decreased relative to older low skilled
workers, the wage of low skilled workers in high immigration states decreased more than in low
immigration states and the wages of young low skilled workers in high immigration states are the
most affected of all.
I use this suggestive evidence to build my identification strategy for estimating the causal effect
of immigration on wages. In particular, I use the period of the shock interacted with the geographic
distribution of Mexicans in 1980 as an instrument for the actual inflow of Mexicans to the US.
In other words, my identification comes from within state comparisons, in years with/without
immigration shock, of the wage of young low skilled workers given the fact that some states received
a larger relative shock than others. Using this strategy I show that a 1% immigration induced labor
supply shock, reduces (young) low skilled wages by around .5-1% on impact, i.e. the first and
second years after the shock. This instrumental strategy is closely related to the (Boustan, 2010)
study of the Black Migration.
Finally I find that Mexican immigration encourages significant across-state reallocation. A 1%
labor supply shock reduces the share of low skilled workers by .2 percentage points. In-migration
rates are particularly responsive. Fewer native low skilled workers migrate to high immigration
states after the shock. This helps to explain why, while the effect on wages is large on impact, it
quickly disappears. By 1999, the fifth year after the shock, wages of low skilled workers in high
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immigration states are not significantly lower than they were before the shock, relative to low
immigration states. This suggests that the US labor market for young low skilled workers adjusts
to unexpected supply shocks quite rapidly.
Several papers estimated the impact of immigration on wages. Closely related to this paper is the
unexpected arrival of Cubans to Miami during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift (Card, 1990). Surprisingly,
even if the influx represented a supply shock of around 7%, (Card, 1990) reports virtually no
impact on labor market outcomes. He suggests instead that the fact that Miami had received many
immigration waves before helped its labor market to absorb unexpected immigration inflows like
the one in 1980. He also points to the fact that some natives who would have relocated to Miami
might have not done so as a result of the Mariel Boatlift7. Also, while he tries to see if labor market
outcomes of particular racial groups deteriorated as a result of the immigrant inflow, he does not
use the fact that the Mariel immigrants were probably low skilled and thus competing with low
skilled workers (independently of their race) and complementing high skilled workers8. Moreover,
the Mariel Boatlift natural experiment occurs in only one local labor market so omitted variables
might have affected Miami during the same period that mitigated the effect of immigration (see
also (Angrist and Krueger, 1999) and (Donald and Lang, 2007))9.
Whether we should focus on local labor markets or the national labor market has been a focal
point of discussion when evaluating the impact of immigration in the US. On the one hand, (Altonji
7Other papers using spatial variation to determine the impact of immigration on the host country using a natural
experiment include (Hunt, 1992). She studies the repatriation of French nationals from Algeria in 1962 when Algeria
became independent. She finds that unemployment rates increased by at most .3% and wages fell by at most 1.3%
as a result of the 1.6% supply shock induced by the repatriates. Several aspects distinguish her paper from this one.
In the first place, she does not have annual data, only data for 1962 and 1968, so she cannot see what is the potential
effect of repatriates on labor market outcomes between 1963 and 1968. Native and immigrant reallocation responses
to locations in France receiving large numbers of repatriates might mitigate possible negative effects of immigrants
on labor market outcomes, something that could reconcile my estimated larger effects on impact. Second, most
repatriates were high skilled workers, potentially affecting labor market outcomes very differently than inflows of low
skilled workers. Finally, she relies on climate and cultural similarity for location choices within France, something
that might not entirely be orthogonal to local economic conditions. See (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995) for an early
literature review for papers using natural experiments.
8CPS data at the beginning of the 80s in a small labor market like Miami is probably too sparse to do it. He does
distinguish by race.
9It is probably the case that while almost all Mexicans that migrated to the US in the 1990s were ready to
enter the US labor market, a smaller share in the Mariel Boatlift were ready to do so. It is well known that Cuban
authorities used the Mariel Boatlift to send prisoners and mentality disordered individuals to the US.
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and Card, 1991) pioneered the spatial correlations approach. This approach compares the labor
market outcomes in different cities or states within the US. A simple regression is, however, hard
to interpret. Immigrants and natives endogenously decide when and where to move within the
US, so estimates from a simple OLS regression are likely to be biased, as emphasized in (Borjas
et al., 1996). (Card, 2001) develops an instrumental variable strategy to try to address these con-
cerns. Immigrants tend to settle where former immigrants settled so that the stock of immigrants
in an enclave is a good predictor of the flow of immigrants to that enclave. Using this instrument
(Card, 2001) shows that immigrant inflows had small impacts on both wages and native outflows10.
However, economic conditions can be quite persistent across regions for reasons unrelated to im-
migration and this may have attracted both early and current immigrants. Another concern with
the spatial correlations approach is that amenities or productivity might be different across regions,
even for specific skill groups, resulting in across state differences in the wage level. It may well be
the case that workers are indifferent between locations even if wages are different. To the extent
that wages are higher because they compensate for worse living conditions, these wage differences
across locations will persist. Under free mobility of the population, immigration will not affect the
equilibrium wages across locations, unless immigrants also affect the amenities or productivity in
the locations to which they migrate11.
On the other hand, (Borjas, 2003) argues that the US is better thought of an integrated national
labor market, since the population is quite mobile across locations. To estimate the effect of
immigration on natives’ wages he relies on the fact that different skill groups at different experience
levels received different immigration inflows over the previous 20 or 30 years. Using this approach he
finds radically different results than the spatial correlations literature. He reports that a 10% supply
shock reduces wages by around 3-4%. He does not take into account, however, the endogenous
decisions of immigrants. Immigrants of a certain skill probably decide to move to the US if the
relative supply of workers of their experience level is particularly low. Failing to account for this
may underestimate the true impact of immigration. Borjas’ estimates could also be biased in the
other direction. If first waves of immigrants were relatively more skilled and less numerous we would
observe that experience cells with more recent immigrants have lower wages, and this would not
10See also (Card and DiNardo, 2000) and (Cortes, 2008). (Card, 2001) reports that a 10% increase in the labor
supply due to immigration is likely to decrease wages by around 1%.
11(Davis and Dingel, 2012) build a model where who lives in your city affects your own productivity through the
exchange of ideas.
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reflect the impact of immigration, but rather the changing composition of immigration and perhaps
the widening of the US income distribution due to skill biased technological change12.
Similar to (Card, 2001) and (Card, 2009), (Ottaviano and Peri, 2010) argue that the impact of
immigration on wages is small but for a different reason: imperfect substitutability between natives
and immigrants. They build on (Borjas, 2003) structural part of the paper by incorporating an
extra nest in the production function and estimate the elasticity of substitution between natives
and immigrants13. As in (Borjas, 2003), however, the identification strategy in (Ottaviano and Peri,
2010) only relies on time series variation. Unlike (Borjas, 2003) they also estimate the elasticity of
substitution between immigrants and natives within education/experience cells. Since this elasticity
is finite, most of the negative effect of new immigrants on wages is on former immigrants and not
on natives. Their estimates of this crucial elasticity, however, have been criticized, see for example
(Borjas et al., 2008), (Borjas et al., Forthcoming) or (Dustmann and Preston, 2012). Using the 1995
Mexican crisis I can partially reassess this controversial imperfect substitutability between natives
and immigrants. Unfortunately, birthplace is not reported in CPS data before 1994. Using instead
Hispanic origin, I show that the shock impacted both non-Hispanic and Hispanic wages similarly.
In other words, I obtain estimates that suggest that immigrants and natives are essentially perfect
substitutes, at least when considering young low skilled workers.
2 Theory
In this section I introduce a model that guides the empirical part. It builds on (Blanchard and
Katz, 1992) but it microfounds all the decisions involved. There are S regions representing US
states14. It has a single final consumption good that is freely traded across regions at no cost.
Workers, who can be high or low skilled, are free to move across regions but have to pay a fixed
12A similar argument is used in (Borjas, 1995) to criticize (Chiswick, 1978) finding that immigrants tend to
experience larger wage growths using a cross section from the 1970 Census. Numerous papers document the widening
of the US income distribution. A nice review is provided in (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011)
13(Peri and Sparber, 2009) provide some micro evidence explaining why immigrants and natives might be imperfect
substitutes as they specialize in different types of tasks. (Cortes, 2008), using (Card, 2001) instrument, also reports
higher impacts of immigrants on former immigrant wages than on natives.
14More generally one can interpret these as local economies.
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cost of moving.15. They live for two periods. They born in a particular location s and only work
and consume when old. Individual workers are uncertain about their future utility in each specific
location. This is the basis for the location choice that derives optimal location using discrete choice
theory (see (McFadden, 1974) and (Anderson et al., 1992)).
Under suitable assumptions on the distribution of the idiosyncratic valuation of locations by
individuals we can obtain closed form solutions relating internal migration flows, wages and exoge-
nous Mexican inflows. In the empirical part, thus, I can estimate two key structural parameters of
the model: the local labor demand elasticity and the sensitivity of internal migration to local labor
market economic conditions. These two parameters are crucial to see how local labor shocks are
absorbed into a larger economy.
The long run equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium in standard spatial equilibrium models,
where indirect utility is equalized across space. In contrast to more standard spatial equilibrium
models in the short run wages might be different than in the long run equilibrium. The model
is similar to the ones developed in the internal migration literature (see (Moretti, 2011), (Molloy
et al., 2011), (Wozniak, 2010) or (Diamond, 2013)) and the international migration literature (see
(Hanson and Grogger, 2011) and (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas, 2012)).
2.1 Utility Function
Workers derive utility from final good consumption, the amenities in a given location and the
idiosyncratic valuation of the location:
E(U is′) = As′cis′exp(is′)/F 1s′ 6=s (1)
Where As′ denotes amenities, cis′ denotes consumption of individual i that is born in s at time t
and moves to region s′ to work at time t+1. I do not include a time discount factor because workers
only value consumption when old. 1s′ 6=s is an indicator function taking value 1 if s = s′.is′ is a
random variable that represents the uncertainty that people face when knowing how much utility
they will be in each particular location. To save notation I do not explicitly label variables by t.
Instead I indicate past variables with a −1 sub index.
15As written, the model abstracts from fixed factors (e.g. land) that can influence the scale of states in order to
focus on incentives in light of disturbances to an initial equilibrium.
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Workers earn the market wage of the location they reside in. Since there is only one good, they
spend all their wage in this good.
Indirect utility of workers is then given by the local wage for their skill type ωs′ ∈ {ws′ , hs′},
the amenities and the idiosyncratic draw they get in location s′, given that they were born in s:
lnV (ωs′ , As′) = lnAs′ + lnωs′ − 1s′ 6=slnF + is′ (2)
In equilibrium, workers will be indifferent between locations, that is V (ωs, As) = V (ωk, Ak)
∀s, k ∈ S. Again, As′ indicates the amenities in the different locations. The fact that amenities
depend on s′ implies that wages need not be the same across locations, nor should it be the case
that wages where immigrants arrive are necessarily lower in equilibrium. This is a well known
result in the spatial equilibrium economic literature (see (Glaeser, 2008)), but one that is worth
emphasizing in the context of immigration.
2.2 Location Choice
Workers decide where they want to reside given the indirect utility they expect to get in each place.
Workers are assumed to be born in a specific location s, from the previous generation. The natural
population growth rate in each location is ns. If they want to move to a new location they need to
pay a fixed cost of lnF . This is, workers maximize:
maxs′∈S{lnVs′ + is′} (3)
In general this maximization problem does not have closed form solutions. Important exceptions
are when is follows a uniform distribution or a generalized value distribution. See (Moretti, 2011)
for the former and (Wozniak, 2010) for the latter. In this paper I am explicit about the distribution
of is:
Assumption 1. is are iid and follow a Gumbel(µ, λ) distribution.
µ is the location parameter. It is not very important in this context because it only affects the
mean of the utility, which does not matter for the choice made by the workers.




(Anderson et al., 1992). High λ will be associated with high variance and this implies that economic
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variables are relatively less important for the location decision. Low λ reduces the variance and,
thus, increases the importance of the economic variables in the individual decision.
The solution to this maximization problem gives the probability that an individual i residing in









lnVs − Φ (5)
where Φ = ln(
∑
k∈S exp(lnVk/λ) does not depend on s, but rather on the wages in every region.





(lnAs + lnωs)− Φ (6)
where Ms,s′ is the population moving from s to s′ and Ns is the native population.
Equation 6 explicitly shows that more people will stay in location s if local conditions are better.
In particular, the stay rate directly depends on the local amenities and the local wages.
2.3 Dynamics
In order to use equation 6 for estimation it is convenient to introduce some notation. By definition
the number of individuals of a certain skill at time t is the number of individuals that stay in that
location (possibly times the natural growth rate ns) plus those that arrive:
Ns = (1 + ns)Ms,s + Is (7)
We can use this equation to express:
ln(Ms,s
Ns
) ≈ −ns − Is
Ns
(8)





(lnAs + lnωs)− ns − Φ (9)
In words, we should expect more people to in-migrate to states where wages increase.
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2.4 Production Function
The production function in all regions is the same. In particular, I consider that a perfectly
competitive representative firm has the following production function:
Qs = Bs[θsHρs + (1− θs)Lρs ]1/ρ (10)
where Ls is low skilled labor and Hs is high skilled labor16. θs represents the different weights
that the two factors have in the production function, while ρ governs the elasticity of substitution
between low and high skilled workers. Bs is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in each state. We
could also introduce factor augmenting technologies, as in (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).17
2.5 Labor market
The marginal product of low skilled workers is:







where σ = 1/(1− ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers. This
defines the labor demand curve.








We can normalise ps = 1. Free trade will guarantee that prices are the same across regions.
2.6 The Mexican immigration shock: from the model to the empirics
I have already derived the key equations of the model: 1) Equation (9) relates migration rates to
wages and 2) Equations (11) and (12) relate current labor force levels with wages.
16In the empirical part high skilled workers will be workers with some college or more while low skilled workers
will be high school graduates and high school dropouts. This is a standard classification of workers into these two
skill groups, see for example (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) or (Card, 2009)
17None of the results that I will report below changes if those technological levels are exogenous to immigration.
On the contrary, if technology responds to immigration shocks, some of the results will change. As is common in the
literature, I do not consider other factors of production like capital. As long as other factors enter the production
function in a Hicks-neutral way this does not affect relative factor rewards.
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In this section I introduce an unexpected increase in labor supply due to the Mexican inflow.
2.6.1 The Mexican immigration shock on low skilled wages
In the empirical section I use 50 states plus the District of Columbia as the S states introduced in
the model18. In particular, states where the shock is larger will see their wage decrease accordingly.
We use equation 11 to obtain19:
lnwst = α1 + β1 ∗ ln(1 + Mexst
Nst
) + γ1 ∗Xst + εst (13)
Where subscripts s and t denote state and time and where I have used the decomposition
Lst = Nst + Mexst. This is, the low skilled workforce is the sum of low skilled natives and
Mexican immigrants. Xst are controls such as the output level, the native employment level and
the technology parameters as can be seen by comparing Equation 11 and Equation 13.
Note that the variation I use for in the empirical exercise is mainly temporal. In other words, I
want to use the fact that at a certain point in time there is an expansion in the supply of Mexican
workers. This is true for every state in the US, but it is specially important in high immigration
states.
If we wanted to give a structural interpretation to the parameter β1 it would simply be the
inverse of the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers.
2.6.2 The Mexican immigration shock on reallocation
By combining equation (13) and (9) and rearranging I obtain the following estimation equation20:
In-migrant ratest = α2 + β2 ∗ ln(1 +
Mexst−1
Nst−1
) + γ2 ∗Xst−1 + ηst (14)
where again Mexst are the Mexican inflows, Nst are population levels and Xst are the controls
implied by the model.
18I show in this section the equations for low skilled workers only, but similar expressions can be obtained (with
reversed signs and different magnitudes for high skilled workers).
19(Borjas, 2003) uses a very similar equation. Instead of using the exact equation that I use he prefers approxima-
tions to it, using the fact that for small x ln(1 + x) ≈ x. He also uses as explanatory variable Mexst
Mexst+Nst instead of
what I use, something that makes the interpretation of β1 less straight forward.
20I use here again the approximation ln(1 + x) ≈ x for small x.
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A similar equation to 14 is used in (Card, 2001), (Card, 2005) and (Cortes, 2008)21. In this
case, however, the estimation equation comes directly from a model.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Data Description
3.1.1 Mexican Inflow Estimates
One of the greatest challenges to measure the casual effect of immigration on low skilled wages is
that it is hard to know with precision how many Mexicans entered each year in every state.
Measures of aggregate inflows by year are available by using the Census 2000 and other sources.
(Passel et al., 2012) offers an estimate of the total number of Mexicans arriving to the US during
the 90s. To the best of my knowledge this is the best estimate. Using data from the Censuses in
the US and Mexico, I can construct an alternative measure of the aggregate number of Mexican
workers entering to the US each year. I report results using both measures.
More concretely, I can use the year of arrival of Mexicans to obtain an estimate of the number of
Mexicans (older than 18 years old) in the US each year, in particular for 1990 and 1995. I can then
combine this with information in the Mexican Census to obtain an estimate of how many Mexicans
were in the US in 1995 22. For the number of Mexicans in the US in 1990, I can either use the 2000
US Census or 1990 US Census. The Census 1990 is likely to suffer more from undercount, since the
number of Mexicans who in 2000 say they were living in the US 10 years before is larger than the
number of Mexicans in the 1990 Census.
Thus, combining information from US and Mexican Censuses I can compute the stock of Mexi-
cans in the US in 1990, in 1995 and in 2000. I can then compute the average inflow between 1990
and 2000, between 1990 and 1995 and between 1995 and 2000. During the 90s a bit more than
350,000 Mexicans entered the US on average, so that the stock of working age Mexicans moved
from around 4 millions in 1990 to a bit less 8 millions in 2000.
The US Census of 2000 also offers information on the specific year of arrival of Mexicans that
were living in the US in 2000 and their age23. We can then know how many Mexicans were still in
21See a discussion of these different specifications in (Peri and Sparber, 2011).
22The Mexican Census reports how many Mexicans were in the US in 1995 that were in Mexico in 2000
23The 2000 Census is the first that reports the exact year of arrival instead of two, three or five years intervals.
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the US in 2000 and could have been working in each year of the 90s. This is an underestimate of
the number of Mexicans who actually arrived in each year, since some Mexicans that migrated to
the US in the 90s are likely to be back to Mexico by 2000 (see (Thom, 2010) for circular migration).
Obviously, the severity of this underestimate is larger the earlier in the decade. With this exercise
we obtain Figure 3. Note that the number of Mexicans who reported 1995 as their arrival year is
around 50% higher than the ones that reported 1994 or 199624:
Figure 3: Mexicans in 2000, by year of arrival
Notes: This figure plots the number of Mexicans that were in the US in 2000 by their reported year of arrival in the
US. Note that the number of Mexicans who reported 1995 as their arrival year is around 50% higher than the ones
that reported 1994 or 1996.
24For instance if we look at the Mexicans in 2000 that arrived to the US in 1994 or 1996, which are around 160000
and the ones that arrived in 1995, which are around 240000, we have an increase in 1995 of 50% with respect to 1994.
I assign this increase in 1995 from the yearly average inflows from 1990 to 1995. Alternatively I could have assigned
this increase from the yearly average inflows between 1990 and 2000 or between 1995 and 2000. Given (Passel et
al., 2012) numbers, what I do is probably the most reasonable. The results reported in the paper do not change if
instead of using what I use, I use these alternatives. Nor do they change significantly if I use (Passel et al., 2012)
estimates instead of the inflows matching the stocks implied by the Censuses.
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I can therefore use two aggregate measures of Mexican inflows: the implied inflows of Mexican
low skilled workers from the Censuses and the estimated inflows of total Mexicans by (Passel et
al., 2012). In fact, both measures are quite similar. The biggest divergence between my estimates
and (Passel et al., 2012) is in 1998 and 1999. Unlike the estimates based on the known stocks of
Mexicans in the US in 1990, 1995 and 2000, (Passel et al., 2012) estimates would over-predict the
stock of Mexicans in 2000. This is the main reason why I use both my own estimates and (Passel
et al., 2012) estimates in the regression analysis.
In any case, the size of the shock, which is the crucial aspect for my identification, is very
similar in both cases 25. To summarize the numbers, in 1995 the inflow increased to between
500,000-570,000 Mexicans up from an average inflow in the other years of around 350,000-400,000
Mexicans for exogenous (to the US) reasons 26. Table 1 provides a detailed account of all these
numbers.
To obtain a measure of the Mexican flows to each state at each point in time I do the following.
First, I predict the place of arrival by the immigrant geographic distribution in 1990 27 and, then,
I assign the aggregate inflows accordingly. In particular, using the 1990 US Census data we know
what share of Mexicans were living in each state in 1990. Let Stock_Mexs,1990 be the stock of
Mexicans living in state s in 1990 and let Stock_Mex1990 be the total stock of Mexicans in the
US in 1990. Then Share_Mexs,1990 =
Stock_Mexs,1990
Stock_Mex1990 is the share of Mexicans in state s in 1990.
To predict the flow of Mexicans to state s at time t we only need to multiply this share by the
aggregate flow of Mexicans (Mext) to the US at time t:
M̂exst = Share_Mexs,1990 ∗Mext
This is the measure that I use for the number of Mexicans arriving to state s at time t, using my
two alternative measures of aggregate inflows. It is worth noting that the measure I obtain using
the 2000 US Census and the one I obtain from (Passel et al., 2012) are almost identical at the state
25These two measures coincide also with the estimated inflows of undocumented Mexicans by the INS combined
with the legal inflows from the DHS. The only difference between both is that the INS reports some more inflows in
1996 than (Passel et al., 2012) or the Census suggests.
26The spike of immigration to the US in 1999 is not exogenous to the US economy, as the US was moving into the
beginning of the dot com bubble, which concentrated to a large extent in California, the largest Mexican immigration
state.
27I could also use the distribution in 2000 instead and nothing changes.
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level: the correlation between both is then .98.
3.1.2 Immigrant Age Distribution
Mexican immigrants tend to be young and compete with younger workers when they arrive to the
US (see also (Smith, 2012)); this has a crucial role in my empirical strategy. The US Census of
2000 allows me to build the age distribution of the immigrants at the time of their arrival (at least
of the Mexicans still in the US in 2000). To do so, I use information on the year of arrival and the
age in 2000. Figure 4 shows that most Mexican immigrants are indeed quite young when migrating
to the US: around 90% of them are between 18 and 30 years old (the red vertical line in Figure 4
indicates 30 years of age). As can be seen in the right panel of Figure 4, this is quite stable across
years and it did not change in 1995 or 1996.
Figure 4: Age Distribution of Mexican Immigrants
Notes: The left hand side graph shows the average age of all Mexicans in the US in 2000 in the year of arrival to
the US. The right hand side graph shows the age in 2000 of Mexicans in the US in 2000 in three selected years of
arrival, 1994-1996. Around 90% of Mexicans are younger than 30 years old when arriving to the US and more
Mexicans than usual immigrated to the US in 1995.
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3.1.3 Wages
I use CPS data to compute two measures of wage: the weekly wage, and the composition adjusted
weekly wage in a state. The first is at the individual level, while the second one is an aggregate
measure at the state level. All wages are in real terms and take 1999 as the base year. The first
measure that I use is the weekly wage constructed from the yearly wage and the number of weeks
worked in a year28.
The raw data on the constructed weekly wages for young low skilled, old low skilled and high
skilled workers are shown in Figure 5. To help the reader see the changes of wages over the years I
have normalized average wages to their 1994 levels.
28The CPS also provides the real hourly wage. This is the reported hourly wage the week previous to the week of
the interview, in March of every year. I do not report results using this variable in the paper, but all the results are
unchanged when using this real hourly wage instead of the real weekly wage. I use the weekly wage because there
are more observations available. The wage and the number of weeks worked reported in a given year refer to the
previous year. Thus, I will use the answers in 1996 to know the wage in 1995.
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Figure 5: Real Weekly Wage by year for Different skill/age groups
Notes: The figure shows the average wage of old and young low skilled workers and the average wage of high skilled
workers normalized to 1994 levels for easy comparison. While wages of low skilled workers are quite flat during the
90s or slightly increasing, the average wage of young low skilled workers decreases between 1995 and 1997. This
small decrease on the aggregate average wage of young low skilled workers is due to the states receiving
immigration. The average wage of high skilled workers increased over the decade. In 1995 this increase was more
pronounced.
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We can see in the Figure 5 that real wages of low skilled workers are quite stable over the 90s
or slightly increasing. However, the average real wage of young low skilled workers is the only
one that does not increase precisely right after the immigration shock (at the aggregate level). In
contrast, wages of older low skilled workers, and wages of high skilled workers increased during the
immigration shock. I show in the regression analysis that this small decrease in young low skilled
wages is driven by the wages of young low skilled workers in high immigration states.
From individual level information on wages I construct an aggregate measure of the low skilled
wage for each state and each year. I want this to be comparable across years, so I follow the
literature by running first stage mincerian regressions to control for compositional effects and I
use the state fixed effects as this aggregate measure of wages. In particular I run the following
regression29:
lnwagei = Xi ∗ βt + δt,s + εi,∀t ∈ [1992, 1998]
Importantly i ∈ IL indicates individuals in the set of low skilled workers and s ∈ S indicates US
states. The subscript t indicates that I run each year in a separate regression. Low skilled workers
are defined as high school drop outs and high school graduates. Xi are the standard controls (Card,
1999): I include potential experience, experience squared, a dummy for black, a dummy for females,
a dummy for rural and a dummy for other races. I also include a dummy for Hispanic origin30. δt,s
is a set of fixed effects capturing the premium in different states. By just using the fixed effects I
am considering the wage of workers with no experience evaluated at the omitted dummy variables,
i.e. white metropolitan male workers.
Note finally, that I could potentially use CPS data to obtain a measure for the number of
Mexicans in each state and point in time. Two things limit this possibility. First, it is unfortunate
that before 1994 CPS questions did not include the birth place of the respondents. Thus I cannot
use this variable to obtain a measure of Mexicans for some of my sample years. Instead, I can use
the variable on hispanic origin. This is actually a good proxy for Mexican origin, especially when
29I follow (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) and I only consider full time full year workers. They are defined as workers
who have worked at least 35 hours and 40 weeks a year and report a valid income wage. I further drop self employed
workers and workers above and bellow 65 and 18 years old. I also correct for top coding following the literature.
Histograms of the raw data are available upon request. In particular histograms of raw weekly wage, experience
levels and age. See also (Autor and Katz, 1999) or (Katz and Murphy, 1992).
30This variable is the best variable available for the full period to proxy for Mexican born workers.
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disregarding the Cuban hispanics and other groups not related to Mexico. The only problem when
using this, is the uncertainty about the undercount of undocumented immigrants (see (Hanson,
2006)).
3.1.4 Summary Statistics
Table 2 shows the main variables used in this paper. They are divided in four blocks. The first
block describes the wages of young low skilled workers at the state level. This is the wage after
controlling for the observable characteristics as described above31. Low skilled wages in 1995 and
1996 are somewhat lower than in the remaining of the decade. In the regression analysis I show
that this can be explained by the immigration inflows. In other words, I show that the decrease
was larger in states where the immigrants entered.
The second block provides some summary statistics on Mexican flows. On average, Mexican
flows represented a 1.5% of the young low skilled labor force. In 1995 Mexican inflows increased
by around 50%. There is huge variation however on the geographic distribution of Mexicans across
states. California is the state that receives more Mexican immigrants. Both in 1990 and 1980
around 57% of all low skilled Mexicans in the US were living in California. This is around 20-30%
of California’s low skilled labor force throughout the 90s. The implied inflow to California during
the 90s is around 10-15% of the young low skilled working labor force: in any given year of the 90s
there were around 1 million full time low skilled native workers in California32 while the aggregate
inflow of Mexicans to the US in the 90s was between 300,000 and 600,000 a year. In 1995, the
unexpected increased inflow was around 8% of the young low skilled labor force. This is a sizeable
shock to a particular group of workers in a local labor market. We can expect an effect on native
wages as well as some labor reallocation away from California.
The third block provides some descriptive statistics on GDP and Trade, while the fourth block
offers statistics on the levels of employment. These variables are used as controls in all my regres-
sions.
31For some descriptive evidence on wages before running the mincerian regressions, see the following section.
32This numbers can be computed from CPS or Census data. According to Census data there were 1,008,213 young




Mexican immigrants arriving to the US are both low skilled and young. Thus, we would expect that
young low skilled workers are especially affected by an unexpected inflow of Mexican immigrants.
A simple way to observe this in the raw data is by running the following regressions:
lnwageit = α+ β1 ∗ Y oungit + β2 ∗ Shockt + β3 ∗ Y oungit ∗ Shockt +Xit ∗ β + γ ∗ time+ εit (15)
lnwageit = α+ β1 ∗ Shockt + β2 ∗HISit + β3 ∗HISit ∗ Shockt +Xit ∗ β + γ ∗ time+ εit (16)
Where lnwageit is the weekly wage of individual i at time t 33. Y oungit is a dummy variable
indicating whether individual i is young (i.e. less than 12 years of experience or younger than 31
years old) at time t. Similarly, HISit is a dummy indicating whether individual i lives in a high
immigration state or not 34. Shockt is a dummy for the time of the shock, i.e. 1995 through
1997. Xit is a vector of individual characteristics: race, gender, rural status, state fixed effects,
metropolitan area fixed effects or metropolitan-state fixed effects. time is a time trend. The sample
of workers used in these regressions is full time full year low skilled workers.
The coefficient of interest is in all cases β3. We expect β3 < 0, so that young low skilled
workers experienced a larger drop in their wage during the shock period relative to the control
group. Similarly, we expect low skilled workers to suffer a larger drop in wages if they are working
in a high immigration state than in a low immigration state. Table 3 reports results from running
regressions (15) and (16).
In the first column of Table 3 I report the regression specified in equation 15 using the full
sample, i.e. low skilled workers. While the shock did not have a negative effect on wages of all
workers, it did decrease young low skilled worker’s wage by 2.5%.
Column 2 drops the workers identified as hispanic by the CPS data. One may think that the
drop in wages that I am reporting comes from a drop in the wages of former immigrants to the
33I obtain the same results irrespective of whether I use the real hourly wage or the weekly wage. The difference
between them is that the weekly wage is constructed from the yearly income in the previous year and has more
observations, while the hourly wage is the wage in the week when the CPS is conducted. I also obtain the same
results irrespective of whether I include state-specific time trends or if I include or exclude the controls.
34High immigration states are the following: California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Illinois and Florida
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US, something suggested in the research by (Ottaviano and Peri, 2010), (Peri and Sparber, 2009),
(Cortes, 2008) or (Card, 2009). Column 2 shows that when only considering non-Hispanic workers
we also have that young low skilled worker’s wage decreased by a bit more than a 3% during these
two years defined as the shock. This result suggests that Mexican immigrant workers and young
low skilled native workers are close to perfect substitutes35.
The third column of Table 3 runs the same regression than column 1 but on high skilled workers
only. The wage of young high skilled workers does not decrease during the shock years relative
to the wage of old high skilled workers. This shows that the effect is only on young workers is
only on low skilled and not on high skilled workers. In column 4 I run the regression presented
in equation 16. I run this regression using the sample of low skilled workers 36. Comparing high
and low immigration states yields a result similar to the age comparison. In particular, low skilled
workers in high immigration states have 3% lower wage than in low immigration states over these
2 years of the shock.
The last column, re-runs regression 16 but using young low skilled workers only. The sample
size decreases substantially, but we can still obtain an estimate that indicates that young low skilled
workers in high immigration states had on average a bit less than a 5% lower wage during the 2
years of the shock.
This table, thus, shows that the main effect of the shock on US wages is concentrated on young
low skilled workers in high immigration states. In what follows I will use the flows of Mexican
workers to each state to obtain a causal estimate of the effect of immigration on wages.
35Another exercise that I have done, but that I do not report in the paper in order not to distract the reader from
the main results is to compare Hispanic wages to non-Hispanic during the year of the shock, using a difference in
difference type specification. The wage on the interaction, Hispanic dummy times Shock, is slightly positive and
statistically indistinguishable from 0. This is evidence suggesting that Hispanic and non-Hispanic low skilled workers
are not imperfect substitutes. There are a number of reasons that can explain my results, see for example (Aydemir
and Borjas, 2011), (Borjas et al., Forthcoming) and (Dustmann and Preston, 2012). Something not discussed in
previous literature that could explain my findings is simply that Mexican workers and native workers may be close
substitutes only when considering young low skilled workers.
36The fact that there are fewer observations in column 4 compared to column 1 is due to the lack of information
on the occupation of certain workers. If I do not include the occupation fixed effects in column 4 the results do not
change and the sample size coincides with that of column 1.
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3.3 The causal effect of immigration on wages
In this section I report the causal effect of immigration on US wages. Following the model I
presented in section 2 (see equation (13)), we can use the following equation for estimation:
lnwagest = α+ β ∗ ln(1 + Mexst
Nst
) +Xst ∗ γ + λ ∗ t+ δs + εst (17)
Where, Mexst is the flow of low skilled Mexican workers in state s at time t, while Nst is the
population of native young low skilled workers. Xst is a vector of controls that includes the total
population of low skilled workers in a given state, the output of the state and its exports to Mexico.
I also include a state-specific time trend and state fixed effects. The total number of observations is
357: 50+1 states times 7 years [1992-1998]. The wage used is the wage resulting from the mincerian
regressions described in the data section.
I could estimate this equation using OLS, but my estimates are likely to be biased. Mexican
workers endogenously decide where to move within the US, and US natives arbitrage away differ-
ences in wages across locations. The unexpected arrival of more Mexicans than usual as a result of
the crisis is the basis for my instrument. I describe the details in what follows.
3.3.1 Instrument
The basic idea to construct the instrument is to use the fact that in 1995 more young low skilled
Mexicans than usual immigrated to high immigration states. A simple way to capture this is to
instrument the relative inflow of Mexicans by the shock and the interaction of the shock and the
share of Mexicans in each state in 1980. Specifically let’s define:
Z1,st =
 1 if t = 19950 if otherwise
and
Z2,st = Z1,st ∗ Mexs1980
Ns1980
Where Mexs1980Ns1980 is simply the share of Mexicans in each state in 1980 relative to the size of the
low skilled labor market in 1980. The identification comes from comparing states with themselves
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before and after the shock, given that the size of the shock is different in the different states due to
the uneven settlement pattern of the early immigrants.
3.3.2 Exclusion Restriction
In this case the biggest concern is that the Mexican crisis not only affected immigration, but it also
affected US-Mexican trade relations.
It could be the case that the devaluation of the Peso increased exports from Mexico to the US.
Figure 6 suggests that this is not the case. It also shows that exports from the US to Mexico in
fact saw a significant decrease. If states exporting to Mexico are the same states where Mexican
immigrants enter, then I might be confounding the effect of trade and immigration. Fortunately,
even if there is some overlap, immigrants don’t systematically enter states that export heavily to
Mexico. The unconditional correlation between the relative immigration flows and the share of
exports to Mexico (relative to state GDP) is below .5. Similarly, in an OLS regression with state
and time fixed effects the covariance between these two variables is indistinguishable from 0.
Furthermore, even if exports to Mexico and immigrants from Mexico occur in the same states,
trade cannot explain why the negative effect is mainly concentrated on young low skilled workers.
Still, to avoid the contamination of my estimates from the direct effect of trade on wages I include
in all my regressions the (log) exports and the (log) state GDP. This should control for the possible
direct effect of trade on US labor market37.
37Data for state exports to Mexico is provided by WISERTrade (www.wisertrade.org), based on the US Census
Bureau. Exports are computed using the ’state of origin’. ’state of origin’ is not defined as the state of manufacture,
but rather as the state where the product began its journey to the port of export. It can also be the state of
consolidation of shipments. Though imperfect, this is the best data available, to my knowledge, on international
exports from US states.
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Figure 6: US trade
Note: Exports US-Mex are exports from the US to Mexico divided by US GDP. Imports US-Mex are imports to the
US from Mexico divided by US GDP. Total US exports are exports from the US to the rest of the world divided by
US GDP. Mexican exports to the US did not increase above trend in 1995, while US exports to Mexico decreased in
1995, potentially affecting labor market outcomes. At the same time US exports to the rest of the world were
slightly above trend in 1995. Source: Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html)
3.3.3 Short run effects on wages
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation 17. The first and second column are the first stage
regressions. They show that during the shock the supply of Mexican workers increased especially in
high immigration states. The second column is a reduced form regression of the instrument on my
dependent variable. It shows that young low skilled wages decreased during the time of the shock,
but they especially did so depending on the share of Mexicans in each state in 1980.
The third and fourth columns show cross state comparisons38. Column 3 is just an OLS re-
gression of wage on relative inflows. In Column 4 I use the share of Mexican workers in 1980 to
instrument the relative inflows of workers in the 90s without including state fixed effects. This
38The spatial correlations literature has been more sophisticated than that in that it has controlled for city or state
wide characteristics by introducing occupations, like in (Card, 2001)
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is, I am doing across state comparisons, pooling all years together. I obtain, like in most of the
literature, small negative effects on native wages. In my case, when I instrument, I can distinguish
the coefficient in the IV regression from 0. However, to the extend that the settlement patterns in
the 80s were based on economic conditions and those are correlated over time, this estimate is not
the causal effect of immigration on wages. Instead it confounds the causal effect of immigration on
wages with the Mexican immigrants and native responses to immigration.
In column 5 I report OLS results including state fixed effects. We already observe that when
making within state comparisons I obtain that whenever inflows are larger wages are lower. In
column 6 and 7 I further specify the years of the exogenous shock. This is I am comparing the
years of the shock with the years that do not experience an exogenous shock. Since the unusual
inflow of Mexicans is high in 1995 (both using Census data and Passel’s estimates) the shock in
this table is only in 1995.
In the last column I report the results excluding California. California is by far the state where
most Mexican immigrants enter and it is the state that exports more to Mexico. We might fear
that most of my findings are driven by this state. In this last column we see that this seems not to
be the case.
All these estimates suggest that a 1% supply shock reduces wages by between .4% and 1% on
impact.
We can use lags to see whether the effects happen only in the first year, or whether the effects
are also noticed in following years. Table 5 shows that the effects of immigration are not only in
the first year, but also 1 or 2 years after the unexpected large inflow. Both using levels and first
differences we obtain a similar result: namely, a 1% supply shock reduces wages by around .4% in
the first ear and by a bit more than .5% the following year. The cumulative effect of a 1% supply
shock is around 1.5% reduction of wages of workers closely competing with immigrants. In this case
I use the lagged instrument for lagged inflows. In Table 6 I replicate Table 5 using (Passel et al.,
2012) numbers. Finally, in Table 7, I use individual observations, instead of state level wages. All
the results are almost identical. In Table 7 I also show that the results are very similar for whites,
females, hispanic and possibly black workers.
To explore how long the unexpected immigration shock lasted I can run the following regression:
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lnwageist = δs +
∑
t
δtHISs + Controls+ εist
where HISs indicates whether the state is a high immigration state, δs are state fixed effects
and δt are year fixed effects. Figure 7 plots the coefficients of the year fixed effects, which are the
differential effect of each year on wages of workers in high immigration states:
Figure 7: Wage differential by year
Notes: This graph reports the coefficient of a regression of (log) weekly wages at the individual level on the
interaction between year dummies and an indicator dummy for high immigration state.
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The graph shows that in high immigration states, wages of low skilled workers were around 5%
lower before 1994. In 1995, they were almost 10% lower and they continued at this level until 1997.
In 1998 they return to the original 5%39. Outside the graph, wages are slightly lower in 1999 than
in 1998 and clearly lower in 2000. The decrease of 2000 is consistent with the spike of immigration
in 1999 reported in (Passel et al., 2012), but it is difficult to argue that these Mexican immigrants
were leaving Mexico for exogenous (to the US) reasons: US was growing fast in 1999 and 2000,
attracting large numbers of workers from around the world.
3.4 Labor reallocation
The most important critique to the cross state or cross city comparisons in the immigration lit-
erature is the suggestion that workers might reallocate when hit by negative wage shocks (Borjas
et al., 1996). This is what the spatial equilibrium literature would also suggest. The exogenous
immigration shock of 1995 is unevenly distributed across US states, offering an opportunity to see
how workers reallocate from high immigration states (HIS) to low immigration states (LIS), as
suggested by the model.
Figure 8 shows suggestive evidence that this is the case. In the dependent axis I have plotted
the share of native low skilled workers in HIS versus LIS. Several key points are worth emphasizing
from this figure.
First, the share of native low skilled workers keeps decreasing over the decade. This is the well
known increase in education levels in the US. This has been documented in the literature on skilled
biased technological change, see (Katz and Murphy, 1992) or (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
Second, the share of native low skilled workers is higher in low immigration states. This is
perhaps not surprising, but it has not been emphasized in other papers. It indicates that when
there are immigrant low skilled workers in the economy, natives tend to either migrate to other
states or acquire more education.
Third, during the shock or perhaps a bit later, the share of native low skilled workers fell less
in low immigration states than in high immigration states, suggesting that either some low skilled
natives moved from HIS to LIS or some high skilled natives moved from LIS to HIS. This is the
effect of immigration on labor reallocation that I want to capture in my econometric exercise.
39See also Table 10.
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Figure 8: Share of low skilled workers HIS vs LIS
Notes: This figure shows the share of native low skilled workers in high immigration states and low immigration
states. The red vertical lines indicate the time of the immigration shock. We observe that the share of low skilled
workers decreases in both high and low immigration states, but that it decreases more after the shock, with some
lag, in high immigration states than in low immigration ones.
The problem with Figure 8 is that it does not allow to distinguish between the inflows and the
outflows, nor does it distinguish whether high skilled workers are the ones reallocating or whether
it is the low skilled ones that move. I investigate this in some detail later on. The first econometric
exercise, however, shows that the intuition obtained from Figure 8 is statistically significant and
identifiable. More concretely I can estimate the following equation:
Share of Low Skilled nativesst = α+ β ∗ Relative Mexican Inflowst + Controlsst + εst (18)
where the share of Low skilled natives at time t and state s is the number of low skilled natives
divided by the total amount of natives in the state (i.e. low and high skilled). I exclude Hispanic
workers since they may be undercounted in the CPS data and to explicitly check that natives are
also reallocating as a response to the shock. The relative Mexican Inflow is the same variable than
in the wage equations. It is the the number of Mexicans entering in the economy, divided by the
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number of young low skilled workers. The controls follow also the wage regressions and the theory. I
include the levels of low skilled and high skilled workers, the (log) GDP of the state, time dummies,
and state-specific time trends. In this exercise, it is particularly important to include time trends.
From the literature on skilled biased technological change (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011)) we
know that the relative supply of low skilled workers has steady declined over the last 30 or 40 years.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe (see (Beaudry et al., 2010) and (Berry and Glaeser,
2005)) that the trends might be different across different states.
Table 8 shows the results of running 18. In the first column we see that in general is true that
high immigration states have lower shares of native low skilled workers in the cross-section. To
identify the causal effect of immigration on reallocation we need to look within states. In column 2
we see that only including state-specific time trends and state fixed effect, we obtain a much smaller
relationship between migration flows and the share of natives that are low skilled in the population.
Importantly, we obtain these results with the lagged inflow of Mexicans. This is, if in a given year,
like 1995, there is an especial high inflow of low skilled Mexicans, in the following year, the share
of low skilled natives is reduced(?).
Columns (4)-(6) show different specifications of the instrumented regression. It is remarkable
to note that only lagged (one and two periods) effects are identified with the shock in 1995. The
results are virtually identical independently of whether I use Census estimates or (Passel et al.,
2012) estimates. Quantitatively, they suggest that a percentage point increase in the young low
skilled participation of Mexican workers leads to a .18 decrease in the share of native low skilled
workers.
To further on what is driving this reallocation I use one of the questions in the CPS about the
state of residence in the previous year. Using this question I can construct the number of people
(high or low skilled) that were living outside of state s at t − 1 that at time t live in s, in other
words the inflows to state s at time t. Similarly I can look at all the people that report that at time
t− 1 were living in state s and that no longer live in state s at time t, in other words the outflows
from state s at time t. By dividing by the current population (of a given skill level and age bracket)
I can construct the migration rates. I can then use these measures to try to establish the effect of
Mexican immigration on inflows and outflows rates.
Migration ratest = α+ β ∗ Relative Mexican Inflowst + Controlsst + εst (19)
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where the migration rates indicate the in-migration rate or the out-migration rate depending on
the specification. The migration rates are computed using the young workers only. In fact there is
ample evidence that these are the workers that move more frequently. Given that Mexican workers
are especially affecting the labor market outcomes of young workers, this is also where we should
expect to find the native response40. I include as controls the state GDP, the exports from the state
to Mexico, as well as state and year fixed effects.
Importantly, the parameter β in this equation can be interpreted using the model. In fact
β = 1σλ so from the estimate of β and the estimate of σ from the wage regressions, we can obtain
an estimate of λ.
The results of running these regressions are shown in Table 9. The first part of the Table shows
the in-migration rates. From the model we would expect that the in-migration rates decrease when
more low skilled migrants enter high immigration states. This is precisely what the regressions show.
Again, the first column shows that in the cross section in-migration rates are not related to Mexican
immigration. In other words, it is not the case that in-migration rates are higher or lower in high
immigration states. When we include state fixed effects and state specific time trends we observe
how this changes after the shock. Low skilled workers that would have otherwise moved to high
immigration states seem to do less so after high inflows of Mexican workers. This is particularly
true in 1996, as can be seen in in the 4th and 5th columns of the Table. In particular a one
percentage point increase in the flow of young low skilled workers workers leads to a .2 percentage
points decrease in the in-migration rate of native young low skilled workers. Instead, as seen in
column (6), it leads to an increase in the in migration rate of native young low skilled workers,
though this is partially driven by the increased attractiveness of California in the years leading to
the dot com bubble.
Instead, if we concentrate in out migration rates, we see that in the cross section high immigra-
tion states have higher out-migration rates. This helps to explain the gap in the share of native low
skilled workers discussed in table 8 and in graph 8. Now, the reaction of out-migration rates is less
instantaneous than the in-migration rates. It is likely to be true that, in the presence of fixed costs
of out-migration, the decision to change destination (towards relatively better local labor markets)
is less costly than the decision to move out to the affected labor market.
40Flows are flows of people irrespective of their working status
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3.5 Longer run effects on wages
Tables 4, 5 and 6 identify the effect of immigration on wages from very short run comparisons. The
identification comes from the drop in wages of the specific group of workers, i.e. young low skilled,
that are competing more closely with the Mexican arrivals. Tables ?? and ?? show that some
reallocation of workers takes places as a response to the immigration shock, that should diffuse
the effect on wages in the longer run. This should help to understand why the typical spatial
correlations literature finds only limited effects of immigration on wages. In this section I replicate
these studies to show that I also get these same results.
Figure 9 shows the average weekly wage of low skilled workers in New York and California in
1990 and 2000 at every age level. It should serve as motivation for the general results. We do
not see significant changes in the wage by cohort between 1990 and 2000 across states. This is
suggestive evidence that by 2000 young low skilled workers in California did not have lower wages
than in less immigration intensive states like New York.
Figure 9: Wages by age in selected states
Notes: This figure shows the wage of native low skilled workers by age for California and New York. The red
vertical lines indicate the age 25-35, young workers in 1995.
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It is easy to translate the figure into a regression framework:
ln(wagea,s,2000)− ln(wagea,s,1990) = α+ β ∗%∆ in Lab. Force by Mexa,s + δa + δs + εa,s (20)
where %∆ in Lab. Force by Mexa,s =
Mexican Inflows in 90sa,s
Labor force in 1990a,s
This is a specification very similar to the ones used both in (Card, 2001) and in (Borjas, 2003)41.
It is a regression of the change of wage of workers aged a in 1990 and workers aged a in 2000. So,
I am comparing the wage profiles of different cohorts in two different decades. I regress these
wage changes on the increase in the labor force of a particular age a in a state s due to the
Mexican immigration in the 1990s. Obviously, Mexicans might be selecting particular states. Also,
Mexicans of a particular age might be selecting specific states if the wages for their age group are
particularly favorable. I build on previous literature to instrument this regression. In particular,
I use the geographic distribution of 1980 to predict where the Mexicans will move to and I use
the overall age distribution of the arrived Mexicans to assign the aggregate flows into the different
geographic/age cells42. More concretely the first stage looks as follows:
%∆in Lab. Force by Mexa,s = α+ β ∗ Pred. %∆ in Lab. Force by Mexa,s + δa + δs + εa,s
where Pred. %∆in Lab. Force by Mexa,s =
Mex Inflows in 90s∗Share Mexs,1980∗Share Mexa,2000
Labor force in 1990a,s .
The results can be seen in Table 10.The first two columns show that Mexican immigrants in the
90s tended to settle where former Mexicans settled. This is the basis of (Card, 2001) the instrument.
Columns three and four show the reduced form regressions, while columns (5)-(8) show the OLS and
IV results. They all point to the same conclusion, namely, that over longer horizons the wages of
natives competing more strongly with Mexicans decrease only marginally. Over this longer horizon,
a 10% immigration induced supply shock reduces wages by at most 1%.
4 Conclusion
This paper uses the Mexican crisis of 1995 to document the causal effect of immigration on US
wages. In particular, I use the fact that Mexican migration to the US is low skilled, young and
41(Card, 2001) uses occupations instead of age. Like in (Borjas, 2003) I pool together together 5 year cohorts from
age 20 to 65.
42I restrict the age groups between 25-55 to avoid cells with small numbers of observations.
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concentrated in certain states, to show that a 1% immigration induced supply shock decreases wage
by a .5-1%.
As a result, natives reallocate across states. When the relative inflow of Mexicans increases by
1 percentage point, the share of low skilled workers decrease by almost .2 percentage points. This
is due to a decrease in the in-migration rates. In other words, fewer natives move towards high
immigration states when these receive unusually high inflows of Mexican workers. This in turn
helps to understand why in 2000 there is no evidence of lower wages of workers in high immigration
states that suffered the shock, relative to the workers in low immigration states.
The fact that this paper uses both (Borjas, 2003) and (Card, 2001) type comparisons and obtains
the exact same result using either approach, should help to clarify the effect of immigration on labor
market outcomes, both on impact and dynamically.
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5 Tables
Table 1: Mexican Stocks and Inflows
Variable Source Number year
Mexican Stock US Cen. 2000 4,274,710 1990
Mexican Stock US Cen. 1990 3,699,873 1990
Mexican Stock US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 6,140,924 1995
(=5,909,696+231,228)
Mexican Stock US Cen. 2000 7,970,009 2000
Average Inflow 1990-2000 (workers) US Cen. 2000 369,529.9 1990-95
Average Inflow 1990-1995 (workers) US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 373,242.8 1990-95
Average Inflow 1995-2000 (workers) US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 365,817 1995-00
Estimated Inflow in 1995 (workers) US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 508,967.45 1995
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 400,000 1992
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 370,000 1993
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 430,000 1994
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 570,000 1995
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 490,000 1996
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 470,000 1997
Mexican Inflow (total) (Passel et al., 2012) 600,000 1998
Notes: This table reports the stocks and inflows of Mexicans in the US in different years. Sources of the estimates
are also reported. When using not using estimates from (Passel et al., 2012) stocks and inflows are computed for
potential workers, i.e. between 18 and 65 years old. Data from Censuses comes from (Ruggles et al., 2008).
’Estimated Inflow in 1995 (workers)’ by assigning a 50% larger inflow of Mexicans to the US in 1995 compared to
1991-1994. See further details in the text.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Wages of Low Skilled workers
Weekly Wage (in logs) 5.687 0.09 357
Weekly Wage (in logs) in 1995 and 1996 5.672 0.091 153
Mexican Migration Flows
Mexican flow (Census) 7351.13 31736.196 357
Mexican flow (INS+DHS) 7215.339 31555.762 357
Mexican flow (Passel) 9327.731 40375.738 357
Relative Mexican flow (Census) 0.015 0.031 357
Relative Mexican flow (INS+DHS) 0.019 0.039 357
Relative Mexican flow (Passel) 0.015 0.031 357
Relative Mexican flow (Census) in 1995 0.02 0.042 51
Relative Mexican flow (Passel) in 1995 0.022 0.046 51
GDP and exports
GDP growth rate US 0.056 0.006 357
GDP growth rate Mex 0.045 0.041 357
exports (in millions) 1079.3 3828.7 357
gdp (in millions) 288375.1 349363.9 357
exports to GDP 0.002 0.003 357
Employment Characteristics (in logs)
Young Low Skilled Full time Employed 11.654 1.091 357
Young Low Skilled Part time Employed 10.793 1.073 357
Young Low Skilled Full time Employed (Non-Hispanic) 11.58 1.054 357
Young Low Skilled Full time Employed (Hispanic) 8.593 1.774 258
Old Low Skilled Full time Employed 12.635 1.072 357
Young Low Skilled Part time Employed 11.43 0.99 357
Young Low Skilled Unemployment Rate 0.226 0.113 357
Notes: These are the main variables used in the analysis of the causal effect of immigration on wages. The averages























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: The causal effect of Mexican immigration on low skilled wages
Low Skilled Wage D.Low Skilled Wage
IV IV IV IV IV IV
rel mexican flow census -0.484*** -0.442*** -0.488*** -0.455*** -0.464*** -0.387*
0.175 0.151 0.175 0.153 0.165 0.208
L.rel mexican flow census -0.675* -0.730** -0.729** -0.823** -0.410 -0.342
0.348 0.367 0.342 0.352 0.577 0.451
L2.rel mexican flow census -0.179 -0.327** 0.445
0.168 0.140 0.557
L.ln wage L -0.206*** -0.238***
0.053 0.058
State fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
State specific trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-val. of F-stat 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
r2 0.827 0.828 0.834 0.838 0.457 0.443
N 357 306 357 306 357 306
Notes: All regressions instrument the relative inflow of Mexicans (Mexican inflow relative to young low skilled
population in state) with the interaction of the share of Mexicans by state in 1980 and a dummy for 1995. Lagged
variables are instrumented by the lagged instrument. Panel regressions at the state level between years 1991-1999.
3 stars is 1%, 2 stars is 5% and 1 star is 10% significance levels. ’rel mexican flow census’ is the relative inflow of
Mexicans to low skilled young natives using estimates for the inflow from the US Census 2000 (see text for more
details). Wages are the state fixed effects from Mincerian regressions controlling for observable characteristics (see
text for more details). Regressions are weighted by the number of observations in the state. Controls include: GDP
of state, exports of state to Mexico, levels of low skilled young and old workers. ’L.’ denotes lagged variable.’D.’
denotes differenced variable.
45
Table 6: The causal effect of Mexican immigration on low skilled wages
Low Skilled Wage D.Low Skilled Wage
IV IV IV IV IV IV
rel mexican flow passel -0.533** -0.534** -0.529** -0.577** -0.550* -0.349
0.239 0.236 0.243 0.228 0.321 0.352
L.rel mexican flow passel -0.825** -0.903** -0.885** -1.006*** -0.520 -0.465
0.401 0.385 0.374 0.349 0.621 0.573
L2.rel mexican flow passel -0.356 -0.546** 0.453
0.261 0.220 0.667
L.ln wage L -0.196*** -0.235***
0.055 0.058
State fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
State specific trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-val. of F-stat 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
r2 0.826 0.829 0.832 0.838 0.459 0.445
N 357 306 357 306 357 306
Notes: All regressions instrument the relative inflow of Mexicans (Mexican inflow relative to young low skilled
population in state) with the interaction of the share of Mexicans by state in 1980 and a dummy for 1995. Lagged
variables are instrumented by the lagged instrument. Panel regressions at the state level between years 1991-1999.
3 stars is 1%, 2 stars is 5% and 1 star is 10% significance levels. ’rel mexican flow passel’ is the relative inflow of
Mexicans to low skilled young natives using estimates for the inflow from (Passel et al., 2012) (see text for more
details). Wages are the state fixed effects from Mincerian regressions controlling for observable characteristics (see
text for more details). Regressions are weighted by the number of observations in the state. Controls include: GDP
of state, exports of state to Mexico, levels of low skilled young and old workers. ’L.’ denotes lagged variable.’D.’
denotes differenced variable.
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